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The Patriation of .ca
Gregory R. Hagen† and Kim G. von Arx‡
top level domain (‘‘TLD’’) (i.e., registry operations) and itsIntroduction 
subdomains. This control enables ICANN and the DoC
to create and destroy TLDs and their subdomains, dele-ountry code top level domains (‘‘ccTLD’’s), such as
gate and redelegate domains of any level, and influenceC .ca, are distinct from generic top-level domains
areas such as rights to names, trademark law, privacy law,(‘‘gTLD’’s), such as .com, in that they are generally con-
domain name distribution, domain name ‘‘taxation’’,ceived to be associated with a specific country. 1 In
Internet stability and security, authentication policy asCanada, the authority to operate the technical functions
well as other areas. 11of the .ca domain name registry has been delegated to
the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (‘‘CIRA’’) 2 The delegation of power by ICANN to CIRA to
by a United States non-profit corporation, the Internet operate the .ca is the cyberspace analogy to the historical
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers delegation of powers by Parliament in the U.K. to Parlia-
(‘‘ICANN’’). 3 The authority to make policy regarding the ment in Ottawa to enact federal laws governing Canada.
.ca has purportedly been delegated to CIRA by the Gov- Legally speaking, Canada is in a similar position with
ernment of Canada. 4 There is an issue, however, as to respect to .ca ‘‘constitutional law and policy’’ now as it
whether ICANN’s delegation of authority to CIRA to was with Canadian law prior to the patriation of the
manage the technical functions of the .ca reflects a Constitution. Analogous to Canada’s constitutional
diminished ability of Canada to decide the identity of powers prior to patriation, Canadian authority over the
the .ca registry and, by implication, to control the reg- .ca is derived from and depends upon a foreign
istry’s operational policies, thereby diminishing Canada’s authority, just as the powers provided for under the Con-
sovereignty over the .ca domain. 5 stitution were derived from and depended upon the
While ICANN has been criticized as illegitimate, 6 Westminster Parliament. Consequently, in order for
unfair, 7 anticompetitive8 and its dispute settlement pro- Canada to obtain sovereignty in cyberspace, we claim
cedure systematically biased, 9 this paper steps back from that policies related to the .ca domain should be
those issues and asks whether acknowledging the tech- ‘‘patriated’’ in analogy with the patriation of the Cana-
nical authority of a private foreign entity over the .ca dian Constitution.
domain is consistent with Canada’s commitment to
political sovereignty. For, as Lessig has pointed out, in
cyberspace, code (computer hardware and software) is
like law in that code regulates how cyberspace behaves. 10 ICANN’s Technical Foundation Applying this observation to the DNS, we argue that the
structure of the DNS, which enables the U.S. Depart- CANN was established as an answer to two problems,
ment of Commerce (‘‘DoC’’) to decide who manages the I one technical and one political. 12 The technical
technical aspects of the .ca, implies that Canada lacks problem is how to ensure the stable functioning of
sovereign control over the .ca domain space and related Internet services such as web browsing and e-mailing.
policies and laws. For example, one should be able to consistently send
While the principal of sovereign control over the .ca one’s e-mail to its intended destination as defined by the
as a Canadian space for e-commerce is important in and receiver’s e-mail address and view the intended web page
of itself, there are also practical consequences that could when a domain name is entered into a browser’s loca-
arise from a lack of control. In short, the hierarchical tion box. The technical answer that has been given is
DNS technology, which ICANN regards as technically that the DNS must be a hierarchical system, with a
necessary, allows the DoC and ICANN to influence crit- single authority, ‘‘a unique authoritative root’’ that, like
ical policies by being able to decide the identity of the .ca the baton of an orchestra conductor, tells Internet users
registry and to tie contractual conditions to the use of a how to find the authoritative domain name mappings. 13
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80 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
On this model, whoever controls the root is the ardization (ISO). Beneath the top level domains are
orchestra conductor. second level domains such as gc.ca, third level domains
such as ic.gc.ca, and so on. Finally there is one infrastruc-The existence of a hierarchical system of domain ture TLD (‘‘iTLD’’) called .arpa. The iTLD is the Addressname servers on the Internet is somewhat surprising and Routing Parameter Area domain and is used to per-when one considers that one of the most fundamental form mappings of domain names to IP addresses. 20aspects of the Internet is the absence of a locus of control.
The original motivation for such a packet switched net- Many registries, such as CIRA, outsource to regis-
work was that of redundancy, or the requirement that trars the service of recording registrations in their respec-
there should be no single point of failure (or control) tive registries (while some registries, such as the TV Cor-
under an attack on the network. 14 A related fundamental poration, record names themselves). In order to initially
principle is the idea of ‘‘end-to-end reasoning’’. Reed and obtain a second level domain name assignment (or a
Saltzer have explained this concept as the idea that, in a third level domain name assignment in the case of those
communications system, a function ‘‘can completely and registries, e.g., Australia and the United Kingdom, who
correctly be implemented only with the knowledge and generally permit only third level domain registrations), a
help of the application standing at the end points of the person whether natural or juridical (‘‘registrant’’) registers
communication system’’. 15 Similarly, Isenberg has an available domain name with the registry via a regis-
written about a new philosophy and architecture where trar or the registry directly. The relevant entity then
‘‘intelligence’’ is at the edges of the network rather than record the registrant’s name, contact information, and
in the network itself is developing. He writes that ‘‘it often at least two IP numbers which point to servers
would be engineered for intelligence at the end-user’s which can resolve the name. Conflicting name mappings
device, not in the network. And the network would be are avoided primarily by allocating domain names in the
engineered simply to ‘Deliver the Bits, Stupid,’ not for gTLDs and most of the ccTLDS on a first-come, first-
fancy network routing or ‘smart’ number translation’’. 16 served basis. 21 The responsibility for adoption of proce-
dures and policies for the assignment of second levelIn order to further understand the technical solu- domain names (or third level, in the cases mentionedtion, it is useful to consider that each computer host on above) and lower level hierarchies of names is delegatedthe Internet is assigned a unique Internet protocol (‘‘IP’’) to TLD registries, subject to the policy guidance con-address which encodes both a network and host identi- tained in ICANN policies and any agreements that mayfier. 17 Because IP numbers are difficult for people to exist between the TLD registry and ICANN.remember and lack portability, Internet standards pro-
vide for the creation of domain names for computer Certain authority relations are coded into the DNS.
hosts. These names also allow for easy memorization and When a user types in a domain name into a browser, a
host name portability over changing Internet service client-sided resolver usually queries a local Internet Ser-
providers. The assignments of domain names to IP vice Provider (ISP) name server to search its corre-
addresses were recorded in a central ‘‘root’’ database sponding database of resource records for a record of the
administered by a single person. As such registrations necessary assignment. Certain kinds of resource records,
increased, however, a hierarchical naming system was called ‘‘zone files’’, contain the assignments of domain
created in order to lessen the administrative burden of names to IP addresses for a particular zone, which is a
name assignments. In essence, TLDs were registered by portion of a domain space. By pointing its resolver to the
the root authority, and the registration of subdomains of ISP name server, the Internet user implicitly acknowl-
TLDs was delegated to TLD registries. edges the authority of the ISP name server’s response. If
the ISP cannot provide the relevant assignment becauseThe legacy root (often called the ‘‘A root’’), or it has not been cached, or the validity of the informationhighest level, of the name space is unnamed. Below the has expired, the ISP server usually queries one of the 13legacy root are TLDs that are divided into classes legacy root name servers. 22 Thus, the ISP also implicitlyaccording to their use as military, educational, govern- accepts the authority of the root server to which it points.ment, commercial, territorial, and so on. Currently, there The root name server is associated with a master fileare 257 top level domains. There are a total of three called the ‘‘root zone file’’ that lists the name and loca-types of TLDs, two of which are relevant here. One is the tion of the TLD servers that the root operator considers‘‘gTLD’’, such as .com, .net, .mil, .gov, etc. 18 These TLDs authoritative. 23are ‘‘generic’’ in the sense that they are generally viewed
as global because they are not associated with any spe- So long as everyone recognizes the same family of
cific territory. 19 The second type of TLD is the ‘‘ccTLD’’, hierarchically organized databases as authoritative, with
such as .ca (Canada), .de (Germany), .uk (United the legacy root name server at the top, the mappings of
Kingdom), .tv (Tivoli), .ch (Switzerland), .au (Australia), domain names to IP address, including those contained
and .jp (Japan), of which there are currently 243. These in the root zone file, will be unique with respect to that
ccTLDs have been delegated to registries, whose codes DNS.24 In essence, on this approach, the uniqueness of
are assigned from a table known as ISO-3166-1, which is name-to-address mappings in the legacy DNS is guaran-































































The Patriation of .ca 81
names and addresses, a key U.S. Government objective hasroot server managed by ICANN, subject to its ultimate
been to ensure that the increasingly global Internet usercontrol by the DoC, from which the entire legacy name
community has a voice in decisions affecting the Internet’sspace is derived. technical management. 34
Canada endorsed the United States’ privatization of
the DNS on the basis that privatization ‘‘divested U.S.
ICANN’s Political Foundation and government agencies of control of DNS functions and
placed control in the hands of a ‘private sector’ group’’. 35Its Implications 
Despite Canada’s stated interest that the U.S. divest con-
he second reason for ICANN’s existence is political. trol over the DNS, the United States never did withdrawT It is the answer to the query ‘‘who should control control over the legacy root server. 36 In fact, the U.S.
the legacy root’’? Whoever controls the root controls General Accounting Office questioned whether the U.S.
which, and how many, TLDs will be entered into the government had the authority to transfer control of the
legacy root and who will be the registry for each TLD. root server to ICANN and has not examined such issues
ICANN has declared that it is the proper entity to because there are no plans to transfer control over the
manage the unique authoritative root, answering the legacy root. It said:
basic political issue surrounding the current DNS. 25
The question of whether the Department has theThus, despite the underlying end-to-end design philos-
authority to transfer control of the authoritative root serverophy of the Internet, a central point of control is used as to ICANN is a difficult one to answer. Although control
a means of coordinating Internet activities and regu- over the authoritative root server is not based on any statute
or international agreement, the government has long beenlating domain names. 26
instrumental in supporting and developing the Internet andInstead of the metaphor of an orchestra, with the domain name system. The Department has no specific
ICANN as a conductor, Reed describes the tendency to statutory obligations to manage the domain name system or
to control the authoritative root server. It is uncertaincontrol as a more sinister invasion of trolls setting up
whether transferring control would also include transfer ofshop under our network bridges who must bless any
government property to a private entity. Determiningnew protocols or applications. 27 Yet, ICANN did not
whether there is government property may be difficult. Tobegin its life as such a troll. Due to the early funding of the extent that transition of the management control to a
the Internet by U.S. government agencies, the United private entity would involve the transfer of government
property, it is unclear if the Department has the requisiteStates government found itself in the, perhaps unwanted,
authority to effect such a transfer. Since the Departmentposition of exercising control over the legacy root. By the
states that it has no plans to transfer the root server system, itmid-1990s, the growth and increasing commercializa- has not examined these issues. Currently, under the cooper-
tion of the Internet led the U.S. government’s Green28 ative agreement with Network Solutions, the Department
and White Papers29 to note the emergence of wide- has reserved final policy control over the authoritative root
server. 37spread dissatisfaction about the absence of competition
in domain name registration. The White Paper called for According to the same review of the privatization of
the government to transfer control of the DNS to a the DNS, Counsel for the United States General
private corporation. Subsequently, a California non- Accounting Office stated bluntly: ‘‘According to the
profit corporation called ICANN was established essen- Department, it has no current plans to transfer policy
tially by Jon Postel, and the government duly recognized authority for the authoritative root server to ICANN, nor
ICANN as the private organization which has the sup- has it developed a scenario or set of circumstances under
port of the Internet community to administer the func- which such control would be transferred.’’ 38 Nancy Vic-
tions of the legacy root. 30 tory, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Telecommuni-
The White Paper noted that some commentators cations and Information commented:
expressed concern that the suggested privatization plan Regarding the A Root server, the Department of Com-
in an earlier Green Paper did not go far enough in merce has no plans to transfer policy control . . . When the
necessary technical capacity is in place, the department may‘‘globalizing’’ the administration of the domain name
enter into a management agreement or other legal arrange-system.31 Some believed that international organizations
ment with ICANN for operation of the A Root server. 39should have a role in administering the DNS.32 Others
More recently, the Energy and Commerce Com-observed that incorporating the new corporation in the
mittee sent a letter to Secretary Donald L. Evans of theUnited States would entrench control over the Internet
DoC reiterating its view that ‘‘any assumption of controlwith the U.S. government. 33 The United States govern-
over that asset [the legacy root] by any outside entityment responded to these concerns in the White Paper:
would be contrary to the economic and national securityThe U.S. Government believes that the Internet is a
interests of the United States.’’ 40 Recent terrorist attacksglobal medium and that its technical management should
fully reflect the global diversity of Internet users. We recog- on the U.S. have increased its reluctance to divest con-
nize the need for and fully support mechanisms that would trol. Andy Müller-Maguhn, Europe’s ICANN Director, is
ensure international input into the management of the reported to have said:domain name system. In withdrawing the U.S. Government
from DNS management and promoting the establishment It might be that after the Sept. 11 attacks, the U.S.































































82 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
control away. It doesn’t look like it at least to me, to be with any policies established through the ICANN policy-
honest, not all. If the United States government never plans development process. 47 Even if such policies were lim-
to give authority over the root zone files to ICANN . . . then ited to those involving ‘‘technical coordination’’, ICANNthe issue might be raised . . . if it’s just the simulation of an
has construed the notion of ‘‘technical coordination’’institution where the real power is the United States govern-
ment. 41 quite broadly so as to include intellectual property, pri-
vacy and competition policy. 48 This would provideICANN’s power, then, is not the power to control
ICANN with a means to control registry and registrarthe legacy root server, which has been retained by the
operations and policies, such as registrant and registrarU.S. government. Instead, ICANN’s power rests in its
agreements.management of DNS functions, which stems from its
contract with the United States DoC. The Memo- One might argue, at this point, that it is ludicrous to
randum of Understanding between ICANN and the believe that the U.S. would threaten the stability of the
United States Government provides as its purpose that Internet in order to redelegate a single second level
‘‘the Parties will jointly design, develop, and test the domain, such as gc.ca, let alone a TLD, such as .ca. More-
mechanisms, methods, and procedures that should be in over, it could be argued that, if a power struggle com-
place and the steps necessary to transition management menced (because, for example, CIRA refused to sign the
responsibility for DNS functions now performed by, or model Sponsorship Agreement) and the U.S. subse-
on behalf of, the U.S. Government to a private-sector quently did remove .ca from the root zone file, services
not-for-profit entity.’’ 42 Under this Agreement, ICANN’s using .ca domains would not come to a sudden halt.
powers do nothing to alter control over the legacy root: Firstly, ISP name servers cache the most commonly used
This [administrative] function, however, does not .ca domains and therefore, the mappings to appropriate
include authorizing modifications, additions, or deletions to IP addresses would not end until the validity of mapping
the root zone file or associated information that constitute data in those zone files expired. Secondly, either CIRAdelegation or re-delegation of top-level domains. The
itself or major ISPs would begin to offer root serverpurchase order will not alter root system responsibility
services, replacing those offered by ICANN.defined in amendment 11 of the Cooperative Agreement. 43
Notwithstanding this reservation of rights, ICANN The difficulty with this idea is that, even if such root
is on a short leash. The U.S. government can terminate server services could be provided, it requires ISPs world-
the agreement on 120 days notice to ICANN.44 wide to recognize the new root. If ICANN redelegated
.ca to another organization whose operations, for theNevertheless, subject to approval by the U.S. Gov-
sake of argument, were in the U.S., then the attempt byernment, ICANN possesses the power to withdraw the
CIRA or an ISP to supply .ca services would potentiallyauthority of any registry, such as CIRA, to act as the
conflict with those services supplied by the redelegatedregistry of their respective ccTLDs, including the sub-
.ca registry. In such a situation, it is likely that most ISPsdomains, and can transfer the ccTLD to other entities or
would rely upon the legacy server system rather thanpersons without such registry’s consent. 45 Indeed, Stuart
CIRA’s .ca. The moral is that, while CIRA .ca services mayLynn, ICANN’s president, recently summed up the
continue to work after ICANN’s removal or redelegationpower that ICANN has over country code domains:
of .ca, the maintenance of Canadian control over the .ca‘‘ICANN could, in theory, recommend that a particular
would require modifications to the DNS protocols andccTLD be redelegated to a cooperating administrator,
architecture so that other ccTLDs recognized CIRA’sand if the US Government accepted that recommenda-
authority over .ca. This paper simply advocates makingtion, non-cooperating ccTLD administrators would be
the requisite changes to the DNS architecture soonerreplaced’’. 46
rather than later.The most straightforward implication of ICANN’s
control is its apparent ability (to be discussed in more A second example of ICANN’s power over .ca is its
detail below) to redelegate domain names, contrary to effects on the privacy rights of registrants. ICANN’s
any national legal requirements that a particular entity Model Sponsorship Agreement — as well as the sub-
be assigned such a domain name. For instance, at the sisting agreements with Australia and Japan ccTLD regis-
highest level, while the Government of Canada may tries — provides that ‘‘[t]he Sponsoring Organization
have delegated CIRA as the authoritative .ca registry, the shall ensure that the zone file and accurate and up-to-
U.S. DoC is able to remove the .ca from the legacy root date registration data for the Delegated ccTLD is contin-
server or map the .ca to IP addresses of a TLD name uously available to ICANN, in a manner which ICANN
server controlled by a different entity. By implication, may from time to time reasonably specify, for purposes
ICANN is also able to force the redelegation of second of verifying and ensuring the operational stability of the
level and lower domains, such as gc.ca and ic.gc.ca. More delegated ccTLD only’’. 49 There is a requirement, then,
subtly, ICANN can tie conditions to the use of domain that the technology of the TLD database must allow
names, including requiring registries, registrars and regis- ICANN continuous access to registration data. This obli-
trants to conform to ICANN policies. For example, gation may contradict the Canadian Personal Informa-
under the Model Legacy Memorandum Agreement tion and Protection of Electronic Documents Act































































The Patriation of .ca 83
party must be with the consent of the subject of the CIRA takes a similar position. 57 More generally the Gov-
personal information in those cases where the registrant ernment of Canada has confirmed that it has ‘‘overall
objects to its disclosure to ICANN.50 policy responsibility for the Information Highway’’. 58
Under the ICANN Government Advisory CommitteeThe simplest, but probably most significant implica-
Operating Rules, the ‘‘ultimate public policy authoritytion of ICANN’s control over .ca, however, is that the
over the relevant ccTLD rests with the relevant govern-U.S. will be able to apply what is essentially a foreign
ment or public authority’’. 59 As a result of its overalldomain name ‘‘tax’’ to .ca domain name registrants. This
policy authority, the Canadian government explicitly setresults from the fact that the Model Sponsorship Agree-
out specific principles which it expected CIRA to imple-ment requires CIRA to contribute to ICANN’s cost of
ment in its policies. 60operation in accordance with the formula devised by
ICANN. To give an idea of the potential magnitude of Originally, Jon Postel of Internet Assigned Numbers
the tax, consider that the Sponsorship Agreement caps Authority (IANA)61 delegated the management of the
the fixed annual portion of the CIRA contribution at top level Canadian .ca domain to John Demco of the
US$5000 and caps the variable portion of the total University of British Columbia (UBC). 62 There was no
annual fee at US$5,500,000 for the fiscal year ending formal delegation of policy authority by the Canadian
June 30, 2002. And while the Agreement provides that government to Demco. Prior to the transfer of authority
the cap shall increase by 15% each fiscal year thereafter, to CIRA, John Demco and his group had managed the
ICANN may increase the tax by a greater amount .ca ccTLD on a voluntary basis with the help of the .ca
without CIRA’s consent. 51 CIRA and its registrants may committee, at no charge to users. 63 At an Internet confer-
begin to wonder if ICANN’s root server services are ence in June 1997 in Halifax, however, concerns were
worth the price. expressed about the delay in obtaining .ca domains
which generated widespread dissatisfaction within the
Canadian Internet community where, under rules of del-
egation, timely responses to registration requests are aA Friendly Redelegation: The Case priority. 64 Following the 1997 meeting, then, it was gen-
of the Mysterious Double erally agreed that the Canadian Domain Name Consult-
ative Committee (‘‘CDNCC’’) should be created toDelegation to CIRA 
address the transition from the current management of
IRA is a not-for-profit Canadian corporation that is the .ca domain to a commercial operation. 65C responsible for operating the .ca ccTLD for all
The CDNCC report proposed that a non-profitCanadians in an efficient and professional manner. 52 The
entity be created much as had been proposed by theCanadian government, in its communications with
earlier Green Paper in the United States. As a result,CIRA and ICANN, has attempted to instantiate the U.S.
CIRA was incorporated as a non-profit corporation ondistinction between technical coordination and policy
December 3, 1998. Industry Canada noted that becauseauthority. This distinction, outlined in the U.S. govern-
its basic goal was to privatize operation of the DNS, thement’s White Paper, holds that ‘‘national governments
role of government in the transition process to a newnow have, and will continue to have, authority to
governing body is ‘‘naturally fairly limited’’. 66 The Gov-manage or establish policies for their own ccTLDs’’, but
ernment of Canada has interpreted its ‘‘fairly limited’’that ‘‘the U.S. continues to believe, as do most com-
role as that of delegating its inherent policy authoritymentors, that neither national governments acting as
over the .ca domain to this private corporation, CIRA.sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as
Thus, on October 10, 2000, the Canadian governmentrepresentatives of governments should participate in
wrote ICANN, stating that it ‘‘recognizes CIRA as themanagement of Internet names and addresses’’. 53
administrator of the .CA. domain’’, 67 and ‘‘formally desig-As regards technical coordination, the Canadian
nate[s] CIRA as the Government of Canada’s designee togovernment took the position that it ‘‘ . . . supports the
be the .ca delegee’’. 68 In the same document, it also setbasic principles of introducing competition but mini-
out certain general principles by which it expected CIRAmizing government involvement in the actual running
to abide.of the DNS’’. 54 While CIRA is responsible for operating
the .ca, ‘‘[t]he Government of Canada . . . has recognized IANA redelegated the technical authority over the
ICANN’s primary responsibility for establishing, dissemi- .ca domain to CIRA on December 3, 1998, and also
nating, and overseeing implementation of the technical outlined the technical functions that CIRA would be
standards and practices that relate to the operation of the expected to perform in accordance with ICANN poli-
global DNS’’. 55 cies. 69 The redelegation went rather smoothly, mainly
In terms of policy, the Canadian government’s posi- because all concerned parties agreed upon the redelega-
tion is presently that ‘‘the .ca domain space is a key tion of .ca to CIRA.70 The basis of the power of delega-
public resource, helping to promote the development of tion is provided for in RFC 159171 written by Jon Postel
electronic commerce in Canada and important to our in 1994. ICANN subsequently adopted policy ICP-172
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effect of giving more power to ICANN than it had under ccTLD to an organization permitting broad participation
RFC 1591. However, these additional powers did not of the Australian Internet community in the develop-
need to be implemented given the friendly transfer of ment of policy for the .au ccTLD’’. 80
power to CIRA.73 The second stage is the delegation of authority to a
Although CIRA was founded upon the idea that new registry. In this matter, ICANN took the Australian
policy authority and technical authority over the .ca con- government’s wishes to redelegate to the new auDA reg-
verged in it, it has been argued here that the need for the istry as decisive, citing the policy of ICP-1 that the ‘‘[t]he
delegation of technical authority to CIRA — which desires of the government of a country with regard to
makes a subordinate name server authoritative over TLD delegation of a ccTLD are taken very seriously. The
subdomains — ultimately reserves a power in the dele- IANA [i.e. now operated by ICANN] will make them a
gator to influence policies with respect to the .ca TLD. In major consideration in any TLD delegation/transfer dis-
the delegation process, the necessity of the technical cussions’’. 81 ICANN also referred to the fact that the
authority to enable public policy authority is evident GAC Principles for Delegation and Administration of
where, in its letter to ICANN, the Canadian government ccTLDs were satisfied as a reason for delegating to the
requested that ICANN effect the necessary changes to new .au registry. Under the GAC principles, the govern-
the Internet’s ‘‘legacy’’ root server to enable CIRA to ment is authoritative over its own ccTLD policy and
operate the .ca in accordance with Government of decides the identity of the ccTLD registry. 82
Canada policies. 74 At present, then, Canada is not sover-
Perhaps the most interesting example of the use ofeign over the .ca.
the U.S. power to redelegate (without any regard to other
ccTLDs)83 is the apparently hostile redelegation of the .us
domain to Neustar. In this case, ICANN did not give as
Hostile Redelegation its rationale the need to transfer the .us to an account-
able organization, since it had presumably already donewo recent hostile redelegations vividly emphasize
so when it delegated the .us registry functions to Ver-T DoC’s and ICANN’s ability to redelegate ccTLDs
isign’s predecessor, Network Solutions. Like Verisign,over objections from the current ccTLD. In each case,
Neustar is a for-profit corporation owned by its share-the national government wanted the redelegation to
holders and not a non-profit corporation accountable tooccur while the existing TLD registry did not. The
its members. Although the U.S. government did notredelegations demonstrate that physical control over the
enter into a Sponsorship Agreement with Neustar, tooperation of the ccTLDs lies with ICANN and the DoC.
whom .us was redelegated, it does show that the U.S.As has been pointed out, control over the architecture of
DoC is prepared to redelegate despite the ccTLD havingthe Internet generally, and the DNS specifically, enables
been previously delegated to a well-run corporate reg-one to control law and policy relating to DNS functions.
istry, such as Verisign. Perhaps the DoC felt that thereThe power to redelegate domains provides ICANN and
was no need to enter into a Sponsorship Agreement withthe DoC with the ability to influence or control the
Neustar because the DoC believed that it could controloperational policies of registrars and registries and to tie
Neustar, a U.S. company, more easily than a foreignconditions to the use of domain names which, in
corporation.essence, constitutes domain name law and policy.
In fact, the U.S. government accomplished theThe first example concerns ICANN’s hostile redele-
redelegation to Neustar unilaterally and withoutgation of the Australian Internet domain name space,
ICANN’s approval. This transfer was completed ‘‘beforenamely all the domain names ending in .au. 75 ICANN
the completion of the normal IANA requirements’’, 84used this opportunity to force the new .au registry to sign
which under ICP-1 and RFC 1591 require a formala Sponsorship Agreement with ICANN by making the
written agreement. It was apparently done without theredelegation contingent upon its execution. In that case,
approval of the then existing .us registry and without theICANN redelegated the top level domain as well as
written agreement required by GAC. While the earliersecond level domains, such as org.au, 76 over the objec-
hostile redelegation of .au was done with ICANN’s fulltions of both the current .au registry77 and the .org.au
approval, the redelegation of .us was not. The official, andregistry, without any finding of misconduct and without
somewhat obscure, explanation from the U.S. govern-a public comment process. 78
ment was that ‘‘because of complexities of U.S. procure-Redelegation consists of two stages: first, there is the
ment laws, it was not able to extend the existing arrange-revocation of authority from an existing registry. Under
ments with VeriSign nor complete the necessary three-ICANN rules, ICANN ‘‘must receive communications
way set of communications among itself, ICANN, andfrom both the old organization and the new organiza-
NeuStar’’. 85tion that assure the IANA [i.e. ICANN] that the transfer is
mutually agreed’’. 79 Ignoring its own policy, ICANN jus- ICANN’s explanation for its redelegation of the root
tified withdrawing Robert Elz as the registry manager was essentially an admission that it does not have any
based on the idea that ‘‘there is widespread — nearly power to stop the U.S. government from changing data































































The Patriation of .ca 85
delegee of authority to concur with the change of infor- ISPs. Thus, if domains are property, they are likely to be
mation in the root. Indeed, ICANN admits that if it had private property based upon the private ownership of the
not accepted the request from the U.S. it would have physical objects underlying the domain names.
‘‘created a situation where the event would have
Thirdly, there is the difficulty that it is not widelyoccurred regardless but there would be inconsistent data
accepted that domain names per se are property. 91 TLDsin the IANA database’’. 86 Given ICANN’s primary mis-
are delegated on the basis of an arrangement, sometimession focus on technical stability, ICANN had to comply
reduced to writing, with ICANN. Second (and some-with the DoC’s wishes.
times third) level domain names are then obtained by
entering into a contract with a domain name registrar
and therefore are, prima facie, contractual in nature. TheSovereign Claims and Property Law contract to provide naming services is generally non-
assignable, indicating that it does not have the transfera-hile Internet architects are primarily interested in
bility of property. This point of view has been affirmedW technical stability — the uniqueness of name
in the U.S. case Zurakov v. Registrar.com, in which themappings to IP addresses — national governments have
court found on summary judgment that:become increasingly interested in national sovereignty
over ccTLDs. 87 National sovereignty over ccTLDs would The question of whether a domain name is a ‘‘property
right’’ has not been considered by the courts of this state.ensure that the national government could control
Accordingly, this court looks to courts in other jurisdictionscountry code domain name mappings and related poli-
that have opined on this issue. In Network Solutions, Inc. v.cies above and beyond the uniqueness requirement. Umbro International Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (2000) the Supreme
Such control would ensure that the identity of the reg- Court of Virginia stated that, ‘‘a domain name registrant
istry and the users of domain names and related con- acquires the contractual right to use a unique domain name
for a specified period of time’’. The Network Court reliedcerns were subject to national law rather than foreign
on Dorer v. Arel, 60 F.Supp.2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999). Incontrol.
that case, the court stated that ‘‘[a] domain name that is not
National governments, through the Government a trademark arguably entails only contract, not property
rights. Thus, a domain name registration is the product of aAdvisory Committee of ICANN, have attempted to
contract for services between the registrar and registrant’’. 92found their claims to sovereignty over their respective
ccTLDs by claiming that ccTLDs are ‘ ‘ public The case of Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
resources’’. 88 Moreover, claims that domains are property Solutions, Inc. is much to the same effect. 93
have been made at both the TLD level and lower levels.
However, contrary authority does exist. In KremenBy subjecting domain names to property rules, one can
v. Cohen, for example, the Court determined thatensure the persistence of TLD and other domain name
although the domain name ‘‘sex.com’’ was not tangibleassignments in the sense that once validly owned,
property under United States law, it was nonetheless adomains cannot be transferred to a third party without
form of intangible property. 94 There have also beenconsent, expiration of ownership, or termination under
claims brought in rem — that is, a claim against theapplicable law. Property rules are to be contrasted with
property itself — against a domain name under theliability rules grounded in contract which compensate
United States Anticybersquatting Consumer Protectioninvalid transfers of domain names monetarily. 89
Act. 95 As this appears inconsistent with the decisions thatNetwork Solutions (the predecessor in interest to
hold that a domain name is not property, it seems tothe existing .com registry, Verisign) has suggested that it
indicate Congress’s intention to affirm that domainpossesses trademark rights in the .com TLD as well as the
names are in some instances indeed property, at least for.com brand and rights to the database of registrant infor-
procedural and execution purposes. 96 The constitution-mation. 90 While some domain names are trademarks
ality of this legislation has been upheld. 97 Nevertheless,and, therefore, the risk of a company losing its trade-
the scope of the property right extends only to domainmarked domain name under a hostile redelegation is
names that are trademarks, and thus cannot support theminimized, such protection only applies to trademarked
claim that domain names per se are the subject of prop-domain names and will not apply where a new regis-
erty rights. 98trant of the trademarked domain is not making an
infringing use of it. Thus, one would have to look to a In Canada, there does not seem to be decisive
general property right in domain names to ensure sta- authority regarding the status of domain names as prop-
bility over hostile redelegations rather than trademark erty. In Easthaven, Ltd. v. Nutrisystem.com Inc., 99
law. Nordheimer J. found that domain names do not seem to
Secondly, the claim that domain names are public be property, but that even if they were, since they exist
property cannot be sustained given the nature of owner- only intangibly in cyberspace, they are not located in
ship of the Internet. The legacy root server is owned by Ontario, Canada. 100 The Court therefore dismissed the
the United States government and arguably its contents plaintiff’s claim that ‘‘sweetsuccess.com’’ was property
are, too. TLD name servers are owned by the TLD regis- located in Canada. Nordheimer J. states his views in
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It does seem to me to be difficult to characterize a space did not gain independence from territorial govern-
domain name as property. When I say property, I refer to ments, but rather reflects the ability of a foreign govern-
either real or personal property. I appreciate that a domain ment to extend an extraterritorial reach into cyberspacename, like a copyright or a trade-mark, could be properly
and beyond. From this point of view, ICANN’s delega-characterized as intangible property. It does seem to me to
be difficult to characterize a domain name as property. 101 tion of authority to TLD registries is analogous to the
delegation of lawmaking power to colonies of an impe-While the status of domain names is unsettled, sov-
rial government.ereign control over domain name mappings cannot be
definitively supported by property law. The central diffi- The question that arises is whether .ca is a cyber-
culty is that, even if there were domestic property rights space colony of the U.S., depriving Canada of sovereign
in domain names, there would still be the problem that authority over its name space and its related policies. As
a foreign government has the power to modify informa- mentioned, these policies and laws not only include
tion contained in the legacy root server, which will regu- ‘‘constitutional’’ policies, such as CIRA bylaws, registrar
late behaviour, regardless of any property laws that may and registrant agreements and dispute settlement poli-
apply to domains. For example, if the Canadian govern- cies, but laws and policies that are affected by the DNS,
ment enacted a law declaring that it is the owner of the such as authentication, privacy, trademark, and other
.ca TLD, it would have little practical effect. Foreign con- laws. If it is, can Canada gain sovereignty over the .ca by
trol over the root implies that the foreign authority can patriating it and its related policies as it did in the case of
decide who is assigned the .ca, can redelegate the the Canadian Constitution?
domain and its subdomains against the wishes of the
The term ‘‘patriation’’ is of uniquely Canadianregistry, and can attach conditions and obligations to the
origin, derived from the verb ‘‘repatriate’’ which meansuse of such domains.
‘‘to restore to one’s own country’’. As Hogg points out,
since the British North America Act 1867 was not a
Canadian Act, it could not be ‘‘restored’’ to Canada.A Parallel with Constitutional Law Patriation, therefore, conveys the idea of a Constitution
ohn Perry Barlow famously declared the indepen- becoming a Canadian instrument. 107 What, then, is theJ dence of cyberspace from territorial sovereigns. 102 The nature of the patriation of the Canadian Constitution?
basic claim to independence results from the fact that The answer of autochthony, which requires that a consti-
because, given current technology, the Internet does not tution be indigenous and derive its authority solely from
yet have naturally occurring borders, the network itself events occuring within Canada, is not, therefore, the
defines a new distinct jurisdiction that can create its own basis of the patriation. 108 The legal force of the Canada
laws and legal institutions. 103 If cyberspace is indepen- Act 1982 and the Constitution Act 1982, like other U.K.
dent of territorial sovereigns, then ICANN’s declaration statutes which extend to Canada, depends upon the
that it is the unique authoritative root for the domain power that the United Kingdom Parliament has over
name space in cyberspace is tantamount to declaring Canada. These instruments depend upon an external
itself sovereign over the entire namespace, including the rather than a local root. 109
.ca domain. A second possible explanation of the nature of
As David Post observed in 1998, the formation of patriation posits that its force derives from the legal ter-
ICANN was a ‘‘constitutional moment’’ and ‘‘an exercise mination of the imperial authority of the United
in a kind of constitution-making, the creation of a global Kingdom. Pursuant to the Canada Act 1982, s. 2, ‘‘[n]o
governing entity with ultimate authority over this most Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed
extraordinary (and most valuable) global resource’’. 104 As after the Constitution Act 1982 comes into force shall
Post has pointed out further, the liberal doctrine of the extend to Canada as part of its law.’’ 110 This discontinuity
sovereign state does not necessarily posit ultimate sover- in the United Kingdom’s ability to legislate over Canada
eignty in the territorial state, but is derived ultimately might have been thought a sufficient discontinuity to
from individual people who are sovereign within that make the Queen in right of Canada (but not in right of
territory. 105 Therefore, ICANN might be considered the the United Kingdom111) Canada’s ultimate source of
sovereign authority over the domain space of gTLDs and legal authority. However, under the traditional view of
ccTLDs as a result of the collective consent of geographi- parliamentary sovereignty, this cannot be correct since,
cally dispersed Internet users. 106 under that view, the United Kingdom could at any time
However, ICANN itself is ultimately controlled by repeal s. 2 of the Canada Act 1982. Accordingly, the
the United States Government, both in terms of the current Parliament could not bind future Parliaments by
technical functions that ICANN performs and the U.S. its present enactments and, therefore, could not be
Government reservation of authority over the informa- bound to refrain from enacting laws for Canada. In fact,
tion contained in the root zone file. Therefore, any use of some scholars believe that there is a paradox of self-
the ICANN domain space is ultimately subject to con- reference involved in thinking that any Grundnorm
trol by the U.S. government. It turns out that, insofar as (basic norm), such as a law regarding the amendment of































































The Patriation of .ca 87
esis, the basic norm would then no longer exist to justify there in the patriation process, then, that could be said to
the new rule regarding amendment. 112 irreversibly terminate the legal power of the United
Kingdom Parliament over Canada? On Hogg’s view, ifPrior to the Constitution Act 1982, the major consti-
the United Kingdom did purport to repeal s. 2 of thetutional document of Canada was the British North
Canada Act, 1982, ‘‘it is inconceivable that the SupremeAmerica Act, 1867, a statute of the United Kingdom
Court of Canada would accept the resuscitated powerParliament. As Canada gained increasing independence
and uphold the new law’’. 117 On this view, Canadianfrom Britain throughout the nineteenth and early twen-
courts would decline to recognize the United Kingdom’stieth centuries, an interesting feature of the British North
authority to make law for Canada and the fundamentalAmerica Act, 1867 became increasingly irritating:
rule of recognition would shift to Canadian courts. 118Canada did not have full responsibility for amendment
Why is that? On Hogg’s view, it is plausible that the factof its own Constitution. As a statute of the United
of independence, and not s. 2 of the Canada Act, 1982, isKingdom, the British North America Act, 1867, which
itself sufficient to terminate the United Kingdom’seffectively was Canada’s Constitution, could only be
power to enact laws or repeal them for Canada. 119 But,amended by the United Kingdom Parliament. 113
how does the fact of independence answer the objection
Following 1867, Canada from time to time that the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom
requested the United Kingdom Parliament to pass legis- can legislate for Canada? After all, the Canadian courts
lation in order to accomplish that which Canadian legal had confirmed in 1981 that the power of the United
processes could not achieve. Legally speaking, the West- Kingdom to enact constitutional amendments for
minster Parliament could enact any legislation for Canada (prior to 1982) was ‘‘unimpaired’’ and ‘‘undimin-
Canada whether such legislation was of a constitutional ished’’. 120
nature or not, and on occasion it did so, dealing with
In other words, under U.K. law, the Unitedmatters as varied as copyrights and lighthouses. Of
Kingdom Parliament can still legislate for Canada just ascourse, practically speaking, Canada was not as
easily as it can legislate for France, and the British courtssubordinate as this legal relationship indicates. In fact, a
will recognize that legislation to the extent possible. As aconvention developed whereby Westminster would leg-
matter of Canadian law, however, the answer should beislate only at the request and with the consent of
that the United Kingdom cannot legislate for Canada.Canada, usually expressed in a Joint Resolution of the
Under the Canada Act 1982, the United Kingdom hasSenate and House of Commons. 114
no power to legislate for Canada after the ConstitutionA small step forward was made with the Statute of Act 1982 came into force. On Oliver’s approach, whichWestminster, 1931. 115 With regard to the power to we have closely followed here, the patriation of the con-amend or patriate the constitution, however, the Statute stitution succeeds not solely from a purported termina-of Westminster, 1931 appeared to maintain the status tion of U.K. authority. 121 It succeeds ultimately becausequo. In essence, the Statute codified the already accepted of the power and authority that is vested in Canadianconvention that Westminster would only pass laws lawmakers by the Canadian public as well as the oldaffecting the Dominion if Canada requested the U.K. to constitutional roots. As Oliver notes, the patriation suc-do so. The preamble to the Statute of Westminster set ceeds because ‘‘ . . . those roots and new roots have beenout the new position of the Dominions in relation to the and are being put down slowly in popular sovereignty, inUnited Kingdom as recognized by the Balfour Declara- regional or provincial vetoes, in aboriginal consents, etc.,tion in 1926. The text of the Statute, as already outlined and a new Canadian constitutional theory will graduallyabove, did not terminate the ability of the United uncover them.’’ 122 Patriation, then, requires a shift in theKingdom to legislate for the Dominions; instead, it set object of ultimate consent within society. Does this sameout the newly restricted terms on which the United explanation hold for the patriation of the .ca domain?Kingdom Parliament could do so. Section 4 of the
Statute provided as follows:
No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed
after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be The Patriation of the .ca
deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that
Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that he analogy between the politics of the domain
that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enact- T space and the politics of real space is striking. Onement thereof. 116 system is the system of legal relations embodied in stat-
However, the Parliament of the United Kingdom utes and common law decisions. The other is a system of
could still, as a matter of law, repeal or disregard section norms embodied in computer architecture. In each case,
4 of the Statute. Indeed, the U.K. Parliament could take there is a hierarchical system of authority relations. The
section 4 to mean that it kept open the legal possibility United Kingdom Parliament and the Courts of the U.K.
of legislative action by the U.K. Parliament for Canada, were superior to the Canadian Parliament, its constitu-
but without Canada’s consent. tion and Courts. The U.S. controlled root server system is
Given that the Canada Act, 1982 only went slightly superior to the ccTLDs. In real space, there is a rule of
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Parliament as law. In domain space, there is a rule of Therefore, ultimate control over the .ca domain will
recognition that recognizes the TLD assignments of the require a change in the technology of the DNS embod-
legacy root name server as binding. In each case, there ying political consent. In the case of the patriation of the
was a delegation of power from a higher level authority. Canadian Constitution, the enactment by the United
Canadian constitutional powers were delegated by the Kingdom of s. 2 of the Canada Act 1982 together with
U.K. Parliament in the enactment of the British North the shift in consent of the governed accomplished the
America Act, 1867. In the case of CIRA, its powers patriation. Patriation of the .ca will, therefore, require not
resulted from a double delegation of power from the only the recognition of Canada’s policy authority by the
Government of Canada and  ICANN. U.S. and ICANN, but some method of shifting the
power and authority of a foreign entity over ccTLDs toDoes the double delegation of power to CIRA entail that of the Canadian government.that Canada is sovereign over the .ca? Like the authority
of Canada itself, the authority of CIRA is not completely The essence of the patriation of the .ca requires that
indigenous, derived solely from events occurring within domain name mapping queries should be resolved by
Canada. As was pointed out, the existence of indigenous national domain registries themselves rather than relying
property law is not sufficient to enable national control upon a foreign root authority to solve domain name
over domain mappings and the technical ability to mapping problems. If a URL is typed into a web browser
operate the CIRA registry was delegated by a foreign and the DNS server that it queries cannot provide an
authority, ICANN. Furthermore, under a proposed answer, the DNS server should query a ccTLD authorita-
agreement between CIRA and ICANN, CIRA must tive registry server directly rather than ask the root server
adhere to ICANN policies concerning the interoper- which registry is authoritative over that domain. Techni-
ability of the delegated ccTLD with other parts of the cally, the open-source BIND software which runs most
DNS and Internet. 123 DNS servers would likely have to be modified and/or
reconfigured to implement the needed technicalA second explanation of Canada’s sovereignty over
changes and new DNS protocols allowing for additionalthe .ca could be that the U.S. control over the .ca has
national root servers would need to be created. 125been terminated by mutual recognition of Canada’s
policy authority over the .ca. In fact, ICANN’s delegation Thus, Canada can take it upon itself to ‘‘enlarge the
of power to CIRA, together with ICANN’s acknowledge- root’’ by creating an additional authoritative root server.
ment that Canada has policy authority over the .ca, Canada could then require domestic ISPs to recognize
seems to put Canada no further ahead in relation to the national root as authoritative. Essentially, instead of
powers over the .ca than it was with the Statute of West- relying on the idea of an authoritative root which is
minster in the case of constitutional powers. Just as the controlled by an independent entity, Canada would
doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament would not retain authority and control over its own domain. The
allow the U.K. Parliament to divest itself of authority issue that then arises is whether the national root will
over Canada, so too the hierarchical nature of the recognize the legacy root as authoritative.
domain name system, with the legacy root server con-
A second step in the patriation process involvestrolled by the U.S. DoC, does not allow authority over
mutual peer-based recognition of authority. This stepdomain name assignments to be divested.
requires that the national authority no longer recognize
Practically speaking, one might claim that Canada the legacy root as an authority. Instead, national roots
can simply ignore any policies that ICANN may want may directly recognize other national roots as authorita-
CIRA and its registrants to abide by, just as Taiwan and tive peers. This peer-to-peer approach can be extended to
the world ignore China’s attempt to legislate for Taiwan other name servers as well. Currently, if a local name
and the U.S. ignores France’s Court orders that are server cannot provide the answer to a query, such as
unconstitutional under U.S. law.124 The recognition of gustavmahler.com, the query is sent to the root which
U.S. control, however, is embedded in software which is returns the address of the authoritative server for the
run by every Internet service provider in Canada. These .com domain. On a peer-to-peer account, each name
domain name servers recognize the legacy root server, or server would point to all the other 243 ccTLD root
one of its clones, as authoritative for determining the servers and the 13 Legacy root servers (or indeed, the 14
authoritative ccTLDs. In turn, individual computer users gTLD registries) as authoritative for their respective
recognize their ISP name servers as authoritative and domains. Therefore, if someone in Canada looked for
such recognition is encoded into the computer operating www.google.de, the resolver would query its local
system. Because of the importance of the rules delegating nameserver as to where it should go and, failing a
authority to individuals ccTLDs in the root zone file and response, then the local name server would direct the
legacy server and the physical and legal control over the query to the German .de root server which then resolves
A root zone files and server by the United States govern- the query. 126
ment indicates that an entity is authoritative with respect
to a country code if and only if it is recognized by the At a political level then, the patriation of the .ca
































































The Patriation of .ca 89
ccTLD server as authoritative for such country. Just as certain legislative matters prior to the patriation of the
patriation required the rewriting of constitutional law, Constitution, ICANN’s consent is required, at least tac-
the patriation of the .ca will require the rewriting of the itly, to create and enforce .ca policies.
constitutional code of the DNS, namely, BIND or other The patriation of the Canadian Constitution was
DNS software. Once BIND or other DNS software is not accomplished solely by delegating law making
modified, reconfigured and implemented as necessary, power to Canada. Nor was the sovereignty of Canada
Internet users will seamlessly use, view, and accept the over the .ca accomplished by the delegation by ICANN
national authority for each individual ccTLD. Their of technical authority to CIRA. Rather, the authority of
computers and their queries would be pointed to the the Constitution came from a shifting of the focus of
relevant country ccTLD server instead of to the previous consent from the United Kingdom to Canada in the
ultimate sovereign root, indicating a shift in consent to context of a limitation of the power to enact laws for
the authoritative country server. Canada. In analogy with the DNS, it can be said that the
courts and people ceased to look to the U.K. courts and
Parliament for the ultimate authority and instead began
Conclusion to look to their own courts and Parliament for guidance
and rulings. In order to patriate the .ca therefore, .cahe Government of Canada has purported to dele-
registrants, registrars, ISPs, and other national InternetT gate authority to CIRA to create and enforce .ca
players must begin to accept the ultimate authority ofpolicies in accordance with government principles. How-
the Canadian government and its designated entity,ever, the power of ICANN, backed by the U.S. govern-
CIRA, in relation to the .ca domain, rather than that ofment, to control the information contained in the legacy
the ICANN legacy servers. This will require a change inroot server, ensures that its tacit approval is required for
the structure of the DNS itself.CIRA operations and policy and the use of .ca domain
names. Claims to sovereignty over ccTLDs based upon We have recommended that ccTLDs should utilize
property claims are not sustainable and, at any rate, are a non-hierarchical, peer-to-peer ccTLD domain name
not sufficient to ensure national control over ccTLDs. system based upon the idea that each national domain
Canada does not, therefore, have sovereignty with registry is the final authority over its own ccTLD, derived
respect to the .ca domain name mappings or policies. from the authority of the national government associ-
Much as Canada required the consent of the U.K. in ated with the ccTLD.
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Mueller, supra note 1 at 50. The present proposal extends this system to tions limit the root to 13 servers. While this system is not peer-to-peer at
national roots as well. Unfortunately, however, present technical limita- a level of individual users, it is peer-to-peer at the level of ccTLDs.
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